Military power begins with industrial strength
President Donald Trump’s recent call for a $1.5 trillion defense budget as part of a broader effort to modernize and strengthen the nation’s defense posture has reignited long-running debates in Washington about how much the United States should spend on its armed forces. That conversation is healthy. But the more important question is not simply how much we spend but where to invest those dollars to ensure real military readiness.
After decades in uniform, I have learned that platforms alone do not win wars. Ships, aircraft, and weapons are only as reliable as the industrial base that supports them. One of the last remaining strategic advantages America enjoys over our potential enemies is our robust, global supply chain. Sustainment capacity, repair timelines, spare parts availability, and production surge all determine whether forces can actually generate combat power when it matters. Today, however, the defense supply chain faces several structural pressures which make it difficult to meet these operational demands. These must be addressed as part of any Department of War (DoW) revitalization effort.
Domestic manufacturing capacity has been diminished as once-robust domestic suppliers of critical components, castings, and forgings have moved overseas or been acquired by the large defense primes. Compliance burdens embedded in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), meanwhile, have discouraged commercial entrants and smaller firms from contracting with the DoW. And the skilled workforce that physically builds and sustains military systems is shrinking as older workers retire and training pipelines narrow, leaving critical trades understaffed. Such structural gaps cannot be left unaddressed.
Recent acquisition programs already show what happens when industrial capacity and supply chains are treated as secondary concerns. The F-35 program has struggled with persistent delivery delays driven by material shortages, late supplier deliveries, and production bottlenecks, with aircraft slipping behind schedule. The Navy’s Ford-class carrier program has likewise absorbed years of delays as complex subsystems and integration challenges with advances technologies strained the shipbuilding base and disrupted fleet planning. Together, these delays reflect more than isolated program management challenges; they reveal structural weaknesses tied to a steady erosion of America’s domestic industrial base.
Without deliberate corrective action, we risk carrying the same vulnerabilities into the next generation of acquisition programs. Advanced jet engine efforts such as the Next Generation Adaptive Propulsion (NGAP) program, for example, are critical to maintaining our technological edge against China but may be especially exposed to supply chain vulnerabilities. While this program is still developmental and hasn’t started production, it will be important to make the necessary investments in our supply chain to address warning signs that are already visible in order to put programs like this in a position for success.
Further complicating things is the fact that fiscal 2026 funding for NGAP currently only stands at around $330 million, a 23 percent decrease in funding from the previous year. The question now is whether acquisition policy and investment decisions will address these systemic constraints before they are embedded in the next generation of platforms.
These examples are symptomatic of deeper structural vulnerabilities. The Pentagon’s own assessments highlight reliance on more than 200,000 suppliers across various acquisition programs — many of whom lack knowledge as to whether parts and materials are domestically sourced or exposed to foreign dependency risks, a problem commonly referred to as “supply chain illumination.” The evidence is already visible in the material supply base, as rare earths, magnets, specialty alloys, and other critical inputs for the most technologically advanced systems remain concentrated in a small number of foreign supply chains. This creates leverage points that can slow or halt production when geopolitical pressures mount and risks constraining America’s ability to generate credible military power when it matters most.
Reversing these structural vulnerabilities will require rebuilding a defense industrial base that can quickly and reliably produce and sustain our military capabilities. One promising model is adapting the incentives provided to the semiconductor industry in the CHIPS Act and tailor them to the defense sector, using targeted tax benefits and capital incentives to bring critical manufacturing, tooling, and materials production back onshore.
But capital alone is insufficient if regulatory friction continues to deter capable commercial firms and smaller suppliers from entering the defense market. Aligning acquisition policy with industrial growth by reducing redundant FAR compliance burdens while preserving necessary safeguards is also critical. Fortunately, in November 2025, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth issued a series of memoranda aimed at improving and streamlining outdated, burdensome acquisition practices to improve acquisition responsiveness and speed, renaming it as the Warfighting Acquisition System. This is a promising start. Looking towards “commercial first” solutions would also help unlock private investment, speed development and widen the pool of capable suppliers.
At the same time, industrial expansion cannot succeed without a workforce capable of executing it. Strengthening the pipeline for skilled trades is as critical as investments in engineers and software developers. Programs such as Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Apprentice School — a partnership between the company and nearby community colleges to create durable talent pipelines — demonstrate how industry and education can align to help meet production needs. In a similar vein, the Navy has invested in the Accelerated Training in Defense Manufacturing (ATDM) program in Danville, Virginia, and is training individuals in advanced manufacturing and trade skills to ensure a steady, sustainable flow of artisans required to build modern submarines. We need more of these focused programs and a dedicated program to inform high school and junior college students of their existence.
National security ultimately hinges on industrial capabilities as much as military ones. There is only a narrow window to align resources with reality, and deliberate steps must be taken to harden supply chains for the next generation of competition or the atrophy will continue. The recently released 2026 National Defense Strategy has “Supercharge the U.S. Defense Base” as a key line of effort in implementing the strategy as a first step. Obviously, the spirit is willing, but it will require some tough investment choices in critical supply chain elements that may not be as compelling and sexy to the Congress. We must continue to stress the dollars we invest today in supply chain readiness will build and sustain warfighting capabilities that make American military power so awesome.
Vice Adm. Lou Crenshaw (Ret.) is the former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements and Assessments.
